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The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation
of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as well
as support from the government and from private foundations, have made
it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated center of
applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to
approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their relations
involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely positioned to
make use of MIT's extensive network of Japan-related resources, which
include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as well as a Tokyo-
based office. Through its three core activities, namely, education,
research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates both to its
sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese science
and technology and on how that science and technology is managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important
means to achieving these ends.
Introduction*
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in East Asia has
increased substantially in recent years.1 Japan's FDI outflows
to the region have exceeded $5 billion annually since 1987, for
example, and totalled almost $10 billion during the 1994 fiscal
year. 2 (See Figure 1). Indeed, official Japanese figures
suggest that in 1994 Japan's FDI flows to Asia as a whole
exceeded such flows to Europe for the first time in more than a
decade. As a result, after North America, Asia has once again
become the second largest recipient of Japanese direct investment
flows of any region in the world.
This rise of Japanese FDI in East Asia has led to
considerable speculation about its character and ultimate
consequences. When Japanese FDI beginning in the late 1980s
surged into North American and European markets--regions never
before recipients of substantial Japanese direct investment
inflows--a number of observers voiced concerns about the
implications of a future increasingly influenced by companies
headquartered in Japan. As Japanese FDI has increased in East
Asia, in partial contrast, some have focused rather on a past in
which Japan gained significant control over a number of East
Asian economies through foreign direct investment and other
means.3 Other observers have asked related questions about
*The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Dennis
Encarnation, Geoffrey Jones, Hugh Patrick and Mira Wilkins on an
earlier draft of this paper.
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whether the development of Japanese FDI in East Asia is
distinctive or even unique as compared to its development in
other recipient regions.
Expanding Japanese FDI in East Asia also has raised concerns
about its impact on American economic interests in that region.
In recent years, of course, there has been widespread debate
about the nature and consequences for extra-regional economies of
integration in East Asia through trade and technology as well as
investment flows. One critical aspect of this larger debate
centers on the effects of growing Japanese and other intra-
regional FDI for external economies such as that of the United
States. A number of observers have wondered in particular
whether rising Japanese FDI in the region is correspondingly
diminishing foreign investment and other economic opportunities
for American firms.4
Although numerous scholars have examined the nature of
Japanese FDI in East Asia to explore these and related questions,
few have systematically done so through comparative historical
perspectives.5 How, indeed, does Japanese FDI in East Asia
today compare with such investment in the past? What,
specifically, are the chief characteristics of such investment in
each period, and how have they changed over time? How does this
investment record compare with the development of Japanese FDI in
the West? In what ways does the development of Japanese FDI in
East Asia contrast with the development of US FDI in the region?
2
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To address these issues, this paper will explore the origins
and evolution of Japanese FDI in East Asia in comparative
perspective. First, this study will trace the historical
development of such investment in the region in terms of amount,
sector, location, motivation and the role of the Japanese
government. Second, the paper will compare and contrast these
various features of Japanese FDI in East Asia over time in order
to identify major continuities and discontinuities in their
respective evolutions. Third, the study will conclude with a
comparison of this record in broader international perspective.
The DeveloDment of Japanese Direct Investment in East Asia
Origins
Japanese FDI first entered East Asia well over a century
ago. As a late developer eager to industrialize yet lacking
requisite technologies and endowed with only limited natural
resources, beginning in the late 1800s Japan strove to develop
export markets for its goods to purchase needed imports of
capital equipment, raw materials and other items.6 In pursuit
of this national strategy, a substantial proportion of Japanese
FDI in East Asia (and elsewhere) was concentrated in those
service sectors which could directly facilitate such trade.7
Japanese trading firms (nascent so=o shosha) were among the
very first enterprises to establish operations in East Asia
3
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during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to
achieve this critical goal.8 Most of this investment was
concentrated in China. Just one year after its founding, for
example, Mitsui & Co. in 1877 set up its first overseas office in
Shanghai to exploit the government-granted export monopoly on
coal from the state-run Miike mines. Before the turn of the
century, however, a burgeoning export business in cotton textiles
had assumed a far greater position in Mitsui & Co.'s Chinese
export business, together with growing imports from China of raw
cotton, soybeans and other basic items. This rising trade led to
the establishment of a whole network of Mitsui & Co. branch
offices in China in the late 1890s and early 1900s. (See Table
1). Indeed, between 1877 and 1914 the trading company had set up
some 46 branches in Asia--mostly in China--but just five in
Europe, two in the United States and one in Australia.
Nor was Mitsui & Co. the only Japanese trading firm which
operated in East Asia during these early years. Mitsubishi Ltd.,
Nihon Menka and Takashimaya Iida, for example, also directly
invested in Chinese trading operations well before the First
World War, exporting such commodities as glass, paper, beer and
matches in addition to cotton textiles, and importing
agricultural products and natural resources. C. Itoh and
Kanematsu Shoten opened branches in Korea, and others set up
offices in Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines and elsewhere in
the region.
4
Major proportions of Japanese FDI initially entered the
transportation sector in East Asia also largely to support the
physical movement of goods between Japan and elsewhere in the
region. By far the largest Japanese direct investments in this
sector were in railways, and by far the largest such investment
was in the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMRC). This firm,
founded in 1906 and partially owned by the Japanese government,
stood at the heart of the transportation system linking the then
Japanese-controlled port of Dalien with outlying Manchurian
markets. According to one estimate, more than half of all
Japanese FDI in China in 1914 was invested in this one firm
alone.9 Japanese direct investments likewise financed the
establishment of railroad lines in Korea both to facilitate
Japanese export penetration of Korean markets as well as to boost
imports of Korean rice and other agricultural products back into
Japan.10
A significant share of Japanese FDI in regional
transportation networks also was concentrated in the shipping
industry. As early as 1875, for example, Mitsubishi Goshi set up
a Shanghai branch to operate its newly-established shipping
business between Japan and China.11 Other Japanese firms, such
as Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK), Osaka Shosen Kaisha (OSK) and even
the SMRC, also directly invested in facilities located at many of
the principal shipping ports of China and elsewhere in East Asia
to foster the flow of goods via this critical mode of
transportation.12 These investments helped pay for the
5
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establishment of branch offices, port facilities, warehouses and
other items.
In addition to FDI in the overseas operations of trading
companies and in the regional transportation infrastructure, to
facilitate trade substantial shares of Japanese direct investment
also entered the financial services sector in East Asia during
these years. Japanese banks, for example, set up branches or
subsidiaries in Chinese and other East Asian economic centers to
provide foreign exchange and other banking services to Japanese
traders in the area. For example, the government-controlled
Yokohama Specie Bank (YSB)--"the bank of banks in the sphere of
foreign trade financing," as one scholar has characterized it--
provided such services through a network of offices in China and
elsewhere, including branches established in Shanghai (1893) and
Hong Kong (1896).13 Indeed, according to one account, "every
time Mitsui & Co. opened a new branch overseas a new YSB] branch
opened in the same city."'14 No fewer than ten new YSB Asian
branches were opened--all in East Asia--between 1898 and
1907.15
Other Japanese-controlled banks in East Asia which directly
or indirectly supported Japan's trade with the region included
the colonial First National Bank of Korea and Bank of Taiwan. 16
Among private firms, Yasuda Bank apparently operated its own
offices in China more than a decade before the start of World War
One. 17 Insurance companies also set up offices in a number of
the main capitals of East Asia in part to protect against losses
6
from the movement of goods between Japan and elsewhere in East
Asia via the maritime trade. 18
Very little Japanese FDI, however, entered East Asia's
manufacturing sector during these years.19 It is true that a
few Japanese firms directly invested in cotton spinning factories
in China shortly after the turn of the century. Japanese trading
firms such as Mitsui & Co. and Nihon Menka operated spinning
factories in Shanghai in the early 1900s, for example, as did the
Japanese-based manufacturer Naigaiwata.20 Yet these
investments were the exception rather than the rule. In 1914,
for example, it is estimated that just 5.5% of Japanese FDI in
the critically important Chinese economy was in the manufacturing
sector, and, more generally, Japanese FDI in East Asian
manufacturing prior to 1914 was very limited.21
Through various means the Japanese government played a
critical role in shaping the flow of FDI from Japan to East Asia
during these years. First, the authorities often encouraged
selected investments through subsidized loans and guarantees for
specified FDI projects as well as through export financing and
other trade assistance which helped shape the overseas investment
strategies of many leading sgao shosha. Second, through
commitments of its own capital in the SMRC and other major
projects in East Asia, the Government itself directly
participated in a number of key investments in this period. 22
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And third, the authorities supported and otherwise
influenced the outflow of Japanese FDI through its broader
political activities in a number of key East Asian markets.
During the years preceding the First World War, of course, a
number of neighboring East Asian economies came under direct or
indirect political control by Japan. Following its military
success during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan gained
control of Taiwan, expanded its already considerable influence in
Korea and acquired greater commercial privileges in China. After
winning the Russo-Japanese War ten years later, Japan took over
the Russian lease on the Kwantung Peninsula, the southern half of
Sakhalin and other assets. And in 1910, Japan annexed Korea.23
These events motivated large numbers of Japanese entrepreneurs to
channel investment funds into these overseas markets in
particular. Indeed, "Japan probably would not have exported
capital in any considerable amounts" to East Asia (or elsewhere)
prior to the First World War, one leading analyst therefore
declared, "had it not been for State protection and encouragement
in areas under heavy Japanese influence or control.,,24
Nonetheless, absolute quantities of Japanese FDI flows to
East Asia were quite limited prior to World War One. China, by
far the largest host to Japanese direct investment during this
period in the East Asian or any other region, had received only
negligible amounts of such investment by 1897, a mere $1 million
by 1900 and a larger but still very modest $190 million by
1914.25 (See Table 2). Indeed, despite the rapid economic
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gains Japan had achieved by 1914, the best estimates suggest that
total Japanese portfolio as well as direct investment in foreign
countries totalled just $260 million by that year. These data do
not, however, include the substantial Japanese direct investments
in its Taiwanese and Korean colonial possessions.26
Expansion
A number of major international political events largely
shaped the contours of Japanese FDI in East Asia during the
.nsuing three decades. The advent of the First World War in 1914
marked the beginning of rapidly intensifying Japanese economic
involvement with neighboring countries and regions which came to
an abrupt halt at the end of the Second World War. In the
interim, Japan expanded its influence in China in particular
following the (1931) Manchurian Incident and the (1937) onset of
the Sino-Japanese War. Japan projected its power still further
afield in East Asia following the outbreak of the Pacific War in
1941. This growing regional influence coincided with Japan's
efforts to construct a so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere designed to more tightly integrate the economies at the
periphery with markets in Japan Proper.
Levels of Japanese FDI grew considerably in East Asia during
the three decades following the start of World War One. For
example, the data set out in Table 2 suggest that such investment
in the critically important Chinese market alone more than
9
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doubled from $190 million to $377 million between 1914 and 1919,
and roughly doubled again, to $763 million, by 1930.27 A
similar estimate of Japan's "direct business investments" in
China reported a roughly four-fold increase between 1914 and
1930, rising from $192.5 million at the start of World War One to
$874.1 million some 16 years later.28 And anecdotal evidence
suggests that this FDI expanded still further as Japan worked to
solidify its regional sphere of influence prior to surrender in
August, 1945.29
Despite this rapid increase, however, as compared to more
recent years levels of Japanese FDI in East Asia generally
remained modest throughout the period. Although Japan had
concentrated the vast majority of its FDI in China by 1930, for
example, its stock of FDI in that country still ranked second to
that of the United Kingdom--yet only a tiny fraction of total UK
FDI was located in China at that time.30 And, according to
Lockwood, at least through the late 1930s Japan's "overseas
business enterprise," though "significant in relation to Japanese
trade and imperialism," was not terribly significant in
comparison to overall national rates of savings and
investment.3 1 On the other hand, Japanese direct investment in
its colonial possessions grew considerably during this
period.32 Indeed, one scholar, apparently including Japanese
direct investments in its colonial possessions as well as in
foreign countries, calculated that the ratio of Japanese FDI to
gross national income was greater in 1930 than in 1986.3 3
__^__1_____1_1____1__11111_1_ 1--1- ---_1111
_
Building on earlier trends, that investment remained highly
concentrated in those East Asian economies in which Japan wielded
major political influence. As suggested in Table 2, for xample,
between 1914 and 1936 Japanese FDI was overwhelmingly located in
the East Asian region in general and in China in particular. 34
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this concentration bias
continued (and may well have become still more pronounced) as
Japan worked to further solidify its regional base and
simultaneously became increasingly cut off from many Western
markets. Moreover, a comprehensive Allied Occupation survey of
Japanese "external assets"--of which reportedly 76% were in the
form of business investments owned by Japanese corporations--
points to a similarly high concentration of Japanese foreign
direct (and other) investments in its regional sphere of
influence at the end of World War Two (see Figure 2). Indeed,
according to this survey, no less than 93.69% of Japan's total
external assets were located in Manchuria, Korea, China and
Formosa in August, 1945!35
In sectoral terms, non-manufacturing industries continued to
predominate. As suggested in Table 3, for example, in the key
Chinese market Japanese FDI in the transportation, import &
export and banking & finance sectors alone constituted a majority
of all such investment in that market in 1932. Still more
pronounced was the Japanese preference for non-manufacturing FDI
in Manchuria in particular. 36 Other studies point to the same




period. 37 Indeed, at least in terms of paid-in capital this
pattern apparently held in the Dutch East Indies as well. (See
Table 4).
Similar to the years prior to World War One, Japanese
general trading companies accounted for a major share of this
non-manufacturing investment. As intra-Asian trade grew (see
Figures 3 and 4 on the growth of such trade in -comparison to
other key regions), virtually all of Japan's major trading
companies expanded their direct presence in China and elsewhere
in the region. Among key Japanese imports were not only
agricultural goods but also raw materials needed to satisfy the
demands of a rapidly industrializing (yet resource-poor) nation,
together with growing exports of manufactured goods. It is
reported that Mitsubishi Corporation alone made -some 100 separate
investments in Asia during the three decades from World War
One.38 Although not nearly as great as their investments in
Northeast Asia, as the period progressed a considerable number of
these and other Japanese trading firms invested in key Southeast
Asian markets as well. Ataka opened some 25 offices in the
Southeast Asian sub-region after 1941, for example, following
closely the progressive conquests of the Japanese Imperial
Army.39 Many other trading firms pursued similar strategies.
(Table 4 lists the extensive 1937 investments of Japanese trading
firms in the Dutch East Indies).
In addition to the direct investments of the trading
companies and again building on earlier trends, large shares of
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fresh Japanese FDI inflows to East Asia entered the trade-
facilitating transportation sector. Remer reports, for example,
that Japanese FDI in the Manchurian transportation sector more
than tripled between 1914 and 1930. Much of this increase, of
course, was accounted for by the government's growing investment
in the SMRC together with that company's own extensive direct
4nvestments in regional transportation projects.40 Greater
amounts of Japanese FDI also entered the railroad and other
transportation sectors in other parts of China, in Korea, Formosa
and elsewhere.41
Finally, FDI in the trade-related financial services sector
continued to expand greatly during these years. The Yokohama
Specie Bank, for example, progressively shifted a greater share
of its resources away from other regions and towards East Asia as
the period progressed. Indeed, between 1932 and 1945 the Bank
set up some 32 offices in China alone together with many other
such facilities in the Straits countries.42 Tokyo Marine and
other insurance companies likewise expanded their earlier direct
investments in the region.43
Japanese FDI in East Asian manufacturing also grew
considerably as compared to earlier years, although in relative
terms this growth remained fairly modest. Much of this new
investment entered the Chinese cotton spinning industry. At
first enjoying huge increases in cotton textile exports to China
following the outbreak of World War One and the consequent
rupture of British and other Western sources of textile supplies
13
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to that large Asian market, Japanese firms rushed to invest in
Chinese manufacturing in that sector following the imposition in
1919 of higher Chinese textile import tariffs. As a result, no
less than seven of Japan's ten leading cotton spinning companies
had established factories in China by the early 1920s to defend
their local market shares.44 Yet cotton spinners were not the
only Japanese enterprises to establish direct manufacturing
investments in East Asia during these years. In the motor
vehicle industry, for example, Nissan moved its headquarters to
Manchuria in 1937 and Toyota set up plants in Tientsin and
Shanghai shortly thereafter.45 Manufacturing investments in
China entered a number of other fields as well. (See Table 5).
Complex motives beyond the purely economic became
increasingly important determinants of Japanese -FDI in the
region. In addition to trade facilitation across a variety of
sectors and efforts to defend overseas market shares in limited
cases, increasing numbers of direct investments were undertaken
to support wider Japanese political and military goals in the
region. These goals included the growing transportation needs of
Japan's colonial army and closer economic integration of the
expanding Japanese Empire. (Table 6, for example, illustrates
the enormous trade dependence of colonies such as Taiwan on the
markets of Japan Proper.)
To support these goals, the Japanese government played a
leading role in the development of its country's direct
investment in the region through World War Two. As in earlier
14
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years, the authorities influenced such investment in multifarious
ways. Colonial officials enticed Japanese firms to invest in
their locales through a host of tax, infrastructural and other
incentives. 4 6 The home government, also as in previous years,
offered protection and encouragement through its influence and
control over many regional economies. And similar to the pre-
1914 period, the public sector itself participated in a number of
key direct investments in the region. (In addition to the SMRC
see, for example, Table 5). Finally, during this period some
leading Japanese enterprises may have been simply ordered by the
authorities to directly invest in a particular project.47
Resumption
As in the period of expansion, major political events also
ushered in the ensuing era of Japanese FDI resumption in East
Asia. The end of World War Two, of course, brought about a
temporary hiatus in the development of such investment in the
region. Surrender brought not only the termination of
hostilities but also the termination of Japanese control over
virtually all its external assets. As Japan regained its
independence and the Occupation drew to a close, however, the
government embarked on new economic policies which once again




The Allied Occupation's Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers (SCAP), froze and, as alluded to above, then
systematically inventoried Japanese foreign direct investments
and virtually all other external assets shortly after taking
power in 1945.48 That September SCAP explicitly prohibited
persons in Japan from engaging in transactions involving these
overseas assets in order to maintain them intact until a
definitive policy could be adopted. In the interim, the Allied
authorities compiled an exhaustive, 3-volume inventory of all
such assets, intangible as well as tangible, owned by both public
and private interests. In that inventory, SCAP found that,
although these assets were located in some 80 different
geographical areas and denominated in 90 different national
currencies, the vast majority, as noted above, were concentrated
in Northeast Asia.4 9
Towards the close of the Occupation, a new policy was
adopted to dispose of these external assets. After a period of
almost five years during which SCAP allowed the authorities of
the territory in which they had been found to control them, it
was decided to handle these possessions in one of two ways.
Countries which had been at war with Japan and who signed the
Peace Treaty were given authority to confiscate and liquidate
these assets and dispose of the proceeds as they saw fit. On the
other hand, assets located in former Axis and wartime neutral
countries were transferred to and later sold by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, which distributed the proceeds as
16
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indemnification to former Allied prisoners of war. By the time
the Occupation ended in 1952, the entire stock of Japanese FDI in
East Asia had therefore been completely eliminated.
The Japanese government fashioned a new policy towards
outward FDI as the nation moved to regain its independence. This
new policy, which operated throughout the 1950s and 1960s,
severely restricted fresh outflows of virtually all Japanese
direct investments. Behind this policy lay the government's
fierce determination to conserve scarce quantities of foreign
exchange and to prevent "reverse imports" of manufactured and
other goods produced by Japanese companies abroad which might
then be shipped back to home markets. Reflecting this latter
motivation, in general the government authorized only those
direct investments in East Asia which facilitated exports of
Japanese goods and imports of critical natural resources.
To control the movement of Japanese direct investment
abroad, the government scrutinized each individual investment
application through a rigorous, inter-agency screening process.
A company whose request was denied simply could not gain access
to requisite foreign exchange. On the other hand, the small
number of firms whose applications were approved found that the
government not only granted them the necessary foreign exchange
permits but also generally supported their overseas investments
with generous tax breaks and other financial incentives. Yet
even in many of these cases the government obliged the investing
17
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firm to pledge that it would not engage in so-called reverse
importing. 50
Responding to this new government policy, a modest number of
Japanese firms--many of which had invested in the region during
the prewar and wartime periods--managed to gain requisite
permissions and directly invest in postwar East Asia. Trading
companies and limited numbers of banks were permitted to directly
invest in the region to help recreate in the postwar period
aspects of the trade-facilitating infrastructure they had once
owned and operated before and during World War Two. Mitsui &
Co., Mitsubishi Corporation and other major Japanese trading
firms, for example, systematically re-established import-export
operations in a number of leading East Asian markets beginning in
the 1950s. A small number of private banks likewise were
permitted to set up facilities largely to provide trade financing
in support of these trading operations.
Some trading and other Japanese firms also directly invested
in East Asian natural resource projects to help satisfy the
nation's growing appetite for such resources as the postwar
economic miracle developed. In the 1960s, for example,
increasing quantities of Japanese FDI participated in projects
such as iron ore and copper mining in Malaysia and the
Philippines, and in natural gas extraction in Brunei.51 Also
during that decade the government participated in at least one
major "national project" to directly invest in the Indonesian oil
sector. 52 Other Japanese FDI during the 1950s and 1960s
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entered regional projects in the agricultural, forestry and
fisheries industries. 53
A limited number of Japanese direct manufacturing
investments also entered East Asia during this period. Before
1960, for example, Yoshihara reports that the Japanese government
approved a total of nine such investment projects in East Asia,
of which four were bound for Thailand.54 A far. greater number
of Japanese overseas manufacturing investments received approval
beginning in the 1960s, however, and most of it apparently
entered this same region. 55 Motivated by rising import
restrictions in Southeast Asia and other factors, increasing
numbers of Japanese manufacturers opted to establish small-scale
local production facilities in the region. Japanese FDI in
Southeast Asian industries such as synthetic fiber and consumer
electronics (the latter principally to assemble intermediate
goods shipped from Japan) are two major cases in point.56
Similar to previous periods, many of these investments were
carried out in concert with leading trading firms. 57
Despite the early resumption of Japanese FDI in postwar East
Asia, however, overall quantities of such investment remained
extremely limited. Between 1951 and 1960, for example, approved
FDI outflows to all regions combined averaged a minuscule $28
million annually between 1951 and 1960, and only $329 million
annually between 1961 and 1970.58 Of these totals, an annual
average of just $13 million was approved for FDI in manufacturing
to all external destinations during the 1950s and a mere $81
19
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million during the following decade. Asia attracted roughly one-
fifth of cumulative Japanese FDI outflows during the 1950s and
1960s, according to the Ministry of Finance, placing the region
second behind North America among global recipients. 59
As in earlier periods, this investment was concentrated in a
small number of regional markets. The specific markets Japanese
FDI entered, however, changed as compared to earlier periods.
The postwar communist rulers of China and North Korea blocked
virtually all FDI inflows after they assumed power, for example,
and anti-Japanese feeling contributed to the continuation of an
effective South Korean ban on Japanese FDI until formal
diplomatic relations were re-established in 1965.60 Rather
than re-entering contiguous markets of the old Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere, in the postwar period the Japanese instead
focused their regional direct investments in Indonesia, the
Philippines, Malaysia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.61 In
short, Japanese FDI remained geographically concentrated in a
limited number of East Asian markets, though the specific markets
they entered differed after war (and occupation).
Growth and Diversification
Again punctuated by important political events, Japanese FDI
in East Asia entered a new era beginning in the early 1970s. In
concert with its larger initiatives to deregulate the nation's
international economic controls, in 1969 the Government embarked
20
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on a five-stage process to liberalize FDI outflows.62 Although
the entire deregulation process took some nine years to complete,
following the mid-1971 implementation of phase three MOF, with
few exceptions, automatically validated greenfield direct
investments abroad by Japanese companies without financial limit.
Rising domestic business pressure as well as increasing balance
of payments surpluses motivated the government -to take this
critical policy initiative.
Changed Japanese government policies together with many
other political and economic developments encouraged Japan's
multinationals to directly invest in East Asia far more
aggressively beginning in the 1970s. Following the collapse of
the Bretton Woods regime, the value of the yen appreciated
sharply and thereby escalated production costs in Japan as
compared to other regional economies. A coincident increase in
real wage rates in Japan encouraged the migration of labor-
intensive manufacturing industries in particular to neighboring
markets such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the countries
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).63 In
addition, rising trade protectionism in the key US market
encouraged still greater Japanese manufacturing . in numerous
East Asian countries as a means to circumvent the threat of
further American import restrictions on goods produced in and
directly exported from Japan.64 More recent motivations
include the desire to supply through local production the rapidly
expanding domestic markets of East Asia together with new and far
21
more liberal foreign investment laws in countries such as China,
Indonesia and Vietnam. 65
These factors contributed to a dramatic rise in Japanese
manufacturing FDI in East Asia during this period. 66 In the
early 1970s much of that investment entered the region's textile
industry, in which Japanese firms such as Toray and Teijin (often
with sogo shosha partners) directly invested considerable sums to
produce a variety of synthetic fibers. 67 Joined in this early,
post-liberalization "investment rush" were a host of Japanese
electronics firms such as Matsushita and Sanyo, which set up
regional plants to assemble home appliances such as radios,
televisions, refrigerators, fans and so forth.6 8 Japan's
automobile firms likewise directly invested in local assembly
operations. (See Table 7.) Yet in later years still greater
sums would be invested in these and many other Asian
manufacturing industries. As a result, by 1995 approved Japanese
manufacturing FDI in the region amounted to more than $33.5
billion, or roughly 43% of all approved Japanese FDI in Asia.
The electrical machinery, chemical and metal industries had by
then attracted the largest shares of such investment in the
manufacturing sector. (See Figure 5).
In addition, Japanese firms operating in a whole host of
service sectors greatly increased their direct presence in East
Asia during these years. By 1995, for example, approved stocks
of Japanese FDI in regional banking, insurance and other
financial services amounted to more than $7.5 billion or roughly
22
10% of all approved Japanese FDI in the region. Trading and
sales exceeded $6.5 billion or about 9% of the overall regional
total that same year. And, as calculated by the Ministry of
Finance, the service sector as a whole accounted for roughly 30%
of all approved Japanese FDI stocks in Asia by early 1995. In
addition to manufacturing and services, roughly 27% of
accumulated Japanese FDI approvals in Asia entered other no;: -
manufacturing sectors such as mining, real estate and
transportation.
Absolute amounts of Japanese FDI in East Asia expanded
prodigiously beginning in the 1970s as compared to earlier
decades. Between 1971 and 1980, for example, approved outflows
of Japanese FDI to Asia (of which the great majority went to East
Asia) exceeded $9 billion, whereas total approved outflows of
such investment to that region amounted to less than $800 million
throughout the previous two decades.6 9 Moreover, between 1981
and 1990 stocks of approved Japanese direct investment in Asia
increased to more than $37 billion, and by 1995 such stocks in
Asia amounted to roughly $76 billion. (See Figure 6). This
rapid increase was fueled in particular by large, sustained
Japanese outflows beginning in the mid-1980s. (See Figure 1).
Also in contrast to earlier periods, within East Asia
Japanese FDI in geographical terms had become far more dispersed.
Prior to 1950, as we have seen, the great majority of Japanese
FDI entered the economies of Northeast Asia. During the early
decades of the postwar period, that investment in the region was
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mainly situated in Southeast Asia. Yet during the quarter
century beginning in 1970, fresh outflows of Japanese FDI to the
region created a pattern of much wider geographical dispersion of
these investment stocks. As suggested in Figure 6, for example,
by 1995 substantial proportions of regional stocks were located
not only in Southeast Asia but also in China, South Korea, Taiwan
and elsewhere in the region.
Finally, and again largely in contrast to earlier periods,
since the 1970s the government has played a less significant role
in influencing its country's FDI in the region. There are, to be
sure, a number of notable exceptions. These include low-interest
loans provided by the Export-Import Bank of Japan and other
public agencies, investment guarantees backed by the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI), the use of overseas
development assistance to support the external activities of
Japanese firms and periodic MITI "vision" statements which can
have important signalling effects for Japanese management
decisionmaking. 70 These and other instances of Japanese
public-sector activity affecting the overseas direct investments
of its private-sector firms suggest that the role of government
in this domain remains more important in the case of Japan as
compared to that of most other major industrialized countries.
At the same time, however, these and other examples of official
Japanese involvement do not compare to either the depth or the
range of Japanese government actions in previous periods of that
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country's modern history to encourage, discourage or otherwise
shape the nation's direct investments in East Asia.
Continuities and Discontinuities
How does Japanese FDI in East Asia in recent years compare
with such investment in earlier times? An examination of the
past versus current character of five key features of this
investment suggests at least one broad generalization.
Investment Levels
Quantities of Japanese FDI in East Asia across time stands
as an important case in point. Historically, of course, overall
levels of such investment in general were quite modest. Although
there are recorded instances of Japanese FDI entering the region
at least as early as 1875, for example, total amounts of such
investment remained very limited throughout the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Rising Japanese FDI in China and
elsewhere in Northeast Asia beginning in the 1930s constitute the
only important exception to this larger historical pattern. Yet
even these investments were eliminated after World War -?~, and
during the first two postwar decades following the Occupation
total amounts of Japanese FDI again were extremely limited. By
contrast, of course, beginning in the 1970s and particularly from
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the mid-1980s quantities of such investment have increased
enormously.
Sectoral Composition
The sectoral composition of Japanese FDI in the region
likewise points to a more general pattern. Beginning in the late
nineteenth century and for many decades thereafter, the vast
majority of Japanese direct investment in East Asia entered the
service and other non-manufacturing sectors. Although the
proportion of such investments which entered manufacturing
increased as World War Two approached, available evidence
suggests that this proportion reached only moderate levels as
compared to the most recent period. It is also true that this
proportion was probably even more substantial during the first
two postwar decades, yet the absolute quantities of such
investment remained extremely small throughout the 1950s and
1960s. Far greater sums entered East Asian manufacturing
beginning in the 1970s, however, and by 1995 well over 40% of the
estimated $76 billion in approved Japanese FDI in the region was
located in this sector.
Location
In addition to level and sector, the location of Japanese




Although there are scattered cases of such investment entering
diverse regional economies from the late 1800s, at least as early
as the turn of the century this investment was highly
concentrated in China and elsewhere in Northeast Asia. Such
geographical concentration became still more pronounced as Japan
both developed its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and was
increasingly cut off from most Western markets. A similar
pattern of geographic concentration occurred during the early
postwar period, although in those years the emphasis was on
Southeast rather than Northeast Asia. Yet here again the most
recent period contrasts with this century-old historical pattern,
for Japanese FDI in East Asia has become far more geographically
diffuse throughout the region.
Motivation
The economic factors motivating Japanese FDI recently as
opposed to earlier periods also contrast. As noted above, for
decades the primary economic motivation for such investment was
to facilitate the flow of goods between Japan and various East
Asian markets. The rapidly growing but resource-poor prewar
economy required large supplies of natural resources and other
primary products scarce in Japan but often plentiful in
neighboring economies. To pay for the import of these goods and
consume the output of its own increasingly industrialized
economy, Japan sought growing regional markets for its own
27
11 -----
products. A very substantial proportion of all Japanese FDI in
East Asia then and during much of the postwar period therefore
was used to create a trade-facilitating infrastructure of trading
companies, transportation firms, and financial services
organizations.71 (Added to this critical economic motive were
a series of political and military factors important principally
during the 1930s and early 1940s.) In recent years, however,
the economic motives for such investment have become far more
complex. Although trade facilitation remains an important
factor, additional motives such as sourcing cheaper labor,
defending regional markets and deflecting trade tension with the
United States also have become increasingly important.
The Role of the Japanese Government
Finally, the role of the Japanese government has changed in
recent as opposed to earlier periods. Throughout the first
century of Japanese FDI in East Asia, the government played an
enormously influential role in shaping its development. Specific
government actions until the end of World War Two included major
financial incentives and creation of politically secure
investment environments as well as direct public participation in
selected overseas investment projects. And during the postwar
period, the government heavily influenced the development and
character of Japanese FDI in East Asia through application of
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both strict controls over all outward investment flows and
provision of financial inducements in many approved cases.
Yet here again the period of growth and diversification
contrasts with the established pattern. Clearly the Japanese
government has continued to play an important role in the
overseas development of its country's firms--particularly in
comparison with the analogous roles of the governments of the
United States and most other advanced economies. At the same
time, however, in contrast to earlier periods the Japanese
government became far less nt :-~i1 in shaping the development
of Japanese FDI in the region after capital liberalization.
In sum, as compared to earlier historical periods the recent
development of Japanese FDI in East Asia along a number of
important dimensions generally is characterized by discontinuity.
There are, to be sure, certain limited exceptions. As in recent
years, during the prewar and wartime period levels of such
investment rose substantially as Japan solidified its control
over neighboring territories, and, again similar to current
trends, during the postwar period as well a relatively high
proportion (but in absolute terms small quantity) of this
investment entered the region's manufacturing sector.
More striking, however, are the many and highly significant
discontinuities. First, the geographical distribution of
Japanese FDI in East Asia has become far more diffuse in recent
times as compared to earlier periods. Second, economic
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motivations other than trade facilitation have become far more
important factors in encouraging the spread of Japanese
investment to the region. Third, the role of the Japanese
government is less significant today than it was in earlier
periods. Fourth, absolute levels of Japanese FDI in East Asia
today far surpass levels registered in earlier years. And fifth,
with the limited exception noted above, a far greater proportion
of such investment has entered the region's manufacturing
industries in recent years.
This investment record hardly suggests that Japanese FDI in
East Asia today is recreating a modern version of the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Although current levels of such
investment exceed those of the 1930s and early 1940s, the
Japanese government, as noted above, does not today shape its
country's direct investments in the region with either the same
degree of influence or with similar regional designs as in the
late 1930s and early 1940s. In addition, that investment is now
far less concentrated in neighboring Northeast Asia than it was
during this previous era, and the overriding motivations are
economic rather than political and military as well.72
International Perspectives
In contrast to the many discontinuities between contemporary
as opposed to earlier Japanese FDI in East Asia, the historical
record points to a number of striking similarities between the
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historical development of Japanese FDI in Europe and the United
States as compared to East Asia. 73 Indeed, a cross-regional
comparison of such investment along the five dimensions analyzed
above points to a remarkable resemblance in the nature of
Japanese FDI in East and West during earlier years as opposed to
the current era. Consider, for example, investment levels. With
the partial exception of the latter expansionary phase in
Northeast Asia, in East and West quantities of Japanese FDI
remained exceptionally small throughout (the roughly parallel)
first century of its development in both regions. Yet in East
and West those levels have expanded enormously since the 1970s
and, in particular, beginning in the late 1980s.
This same general pattern holds for each of the other four
characteristics of Japanese FDI across these regions. With
respect to sectoral composition, for instance, such investment in
East Asia as well as the United States and Europe was largely
focused in services and other non-manufacturing sectors
throughout its first century of development, but the proportion
entering manufacturing has increased greatly in both areas during
the last 25 years. So, too, in locational terms a similar
pattern holds. Historically, Japanese FDI in the United States
and Europe, as in East Asia, was geographically concentrated in a
small number of locales. Beginning in the 1970s, however,
Japanese firms have dispersed their direct investments far more
widely in the West as in the East.
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In addition, throughout most of its first century of
development Japanese FDI in the United States and Europe as well
as in East Asia was based largely on the economic motive of
facilitating trade flows between Japan and economies receiving
such investment, yet in both areas those economic motives have
become far more complex in recent times. And finally, the
Japanese government was enormously influential in shaping the
development of its country's FDI in East and West from the
origins of such investment through the 1960s, yet in the last 25
years that influence has declined substantially. In short, when
comparing current versus past Japanese FDI in East Asia as
opposed to the development of Japanese FDI in East versus West,
the major similarities or continuities are apparently spatial
(ie, geographic) rather than temporal.74
A second broad comparison, juxtaposing the historical
development of US and Japanese FDI in East Asia, provides some
insight into current debates over America's evolving economic
presence in the region. With respect to the prewar era, the US
Department of Commerce estimates that total US FDI in all of Asia
amounted to a meager $175 million in 1919 and just $446 million
ten years later. 75 (See Table 8). By contrast, estimates
place Japanese FDI at $377 million in China alone in 1919, and at
roughly $763 million just in China and Manchuria in 1930. (See
Table 2). Moreover, in 1929/1930 the vast majority of Japanese
FDI was located in the East Asian region, whereas the proportion
of US FDI in this region as a share of total US FDI abroad then
32
------- -_1_1___ _~
reached barely 6%. Commerce Department data for 1929 also point
to a far greater geographical dispersion of US FDI in Asia--to
key Southeast Asian recipients such as the Philippines and the
Dutch East Indies as well as Northeast Asian recipients such as
China--than is the case for Japanese FDI in the region at this
time. 76
The relative position and location of US and Japanese FDI in
East Asia alternated twice in later years. Following some two
decades of rapid postwar US FDI growth abroad together with
simultaneously strict enforcement of Japanese controls on capital
outflows, by 970 stocks of US direct investment in East Asia far
exceeded those of Japan--even though just 3% of all US FDI stocks
(versus 21% for Japan) were located in the region at that
time.77 In fact, by 1970 the United States had directly
invested almost as much in the Philippines ($640 million) as
Japan had directly invested in the entire region.
By 1995, however, the Japanese FDI presence in East Asia
once again exceeded that of the United States. In stock terms,
for example, in 1995 Japanese FDI in East Asia amounted to
roughly $76 billion, whereas the corresponding US total stood at
roughly $46 billion (see Figures 6 and 7). On the other hand,
the share of US FDI stocks in the region as a proportion of its
g.obal direct investment levels had risen substantially--from
roughly 3% to about 7.5%--during the latest quarter century.
(Indeed, as suggested in Figure 8, at the end of 1994 US FDI in
the Asia/Pacific region as a whole accounted for roughly 18% of
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total US FDI stocks abroad.) By contrast, the corresponding
Japanese share in East Asia had somewhat declined, from 21% to
16%, during this same period (see Figure 9 for the global
breakdown of Japanese FDI at the end of the 1994 fiscal year).
Therefore, both in absolute terms throughout most of the
twentieth century and as a percentage of its worldwide stocks
during the last quarter century, US FDI in East Asia has expanded
prodigiously, yet in absolute terms the rapid growth of Japanese
FDI in the region in recent years has been still more dramatic.
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Note: Percentages do not to-al 100 due to rounding. Historical cost basis.
Source' S Depar ment of Commerce.
FIGURE 8
US FDI Position by Region
as of December 31 ,1994 (Percent)
Latin Am/Other W Hem. 1S%-
Note- Historical Cost Basisj ie..,-
source: US Depar:mentL
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Notes: Percentages do not eual 100 due to rounding. Approvals basis.
Source: Ministry o Finance (Japan).
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THE OPENING OF MITSUI & CO. BRANCH OFFICES ABROAD, 1893-19.10
Europe, the U.S., and
Year Asia others
1893 Bombay
1896 Yingkou (Niuzhuang), Taipei New York (reopened)
1898 San Francisco
1899 Jinsen, Xiamen (Amoy), Zhifu Hamburg






1906 Shantou, Dagou (Gaoxiong), Oklahoma City
Andong Xian, Tieling, Calcutta,
Shenyang, Bangkok, Qingdao
1907 Rangoon, Jilin, Kuanchengzi Portland, Vladivostok
(Changchun), Saigon, Harbin
1908 Pusan, Zhanghua (Taizhong) Lyons ( o..4)
1910 Akou
Source: Kawabe Nobuo, "Development of Overseas Trading Operations by General
Trading Companies, 1868-1945" in Yonekawa Shinichi and Yoshihara
Hideki, eds., Business History of General Trading Companies (Tokyo:
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Table 4
LEADING JAPANESE ENTERPRISES IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES (1937)
Comoanv Name
I. Anrc:.ure 1) Borneo Rubber
2) Nanyo Rubber




7) Nanwa Rubber Plant
8) Nomura East Indies
9) Okura Sumatra Agriculture
10) Indonesia Development
1 1) Nangoku Industries
12) Nangoku Plantation
13) Dai Nippon Sugar
14) Indonesia Forest Indus-ry

































































































1) Yokahama s,I & i.
2) Mitsui Ban,
3) Bank of Taiwan









































Numaguchi Gen, "Nihon no kaigaijigyo toshi: sono rekishiteki kado to keieiteki yoran"
(The Overseas Investments of Japanese Enterprise: The Historical Process and Key









NUMBER OF DIRECT INVESTMENTS AND MILITARY CONTROLLED PLANTS
































































































Total 522 35 3 159**
Notes: * Small scale, personally managed concerns.
** Chinese plants occupied by the Japanese Army
entrusted to Japanese industrial enterprises.
whose management was






_ _ __ I 1111
- - - ---- -- ;-------- -- ----- ---- rre i-e II
IIII
---- -- _  _ __  111
...... --
------------------- -- -- 1·11
------*rrc--·--- 
-· 1SIC--^.*I-"* ---.-· I- r --· .. 
_
oo 










in 0 V - o t-
o o C4 N % 
FZ £ o oFoo % m ,
~0r .. : "
mu
=o a~ ~ * oo
- - 00





































m eono c- 








I -l .V: _ t u~~~~
*a ai I 





I . * : S 
c · c =
C6 >r ·d
cc~P















C X *C Cu X
CC C Ur *XCC- S > Cu
0 CX 































































I-.---llrii I.· -X.·--Il_ .--...1. I .__..
- I---------·--II ·n I -OllllrUEfiilrur.l-EEi2lr^--LZI-





t' a O I I Il,







; M fn I i I










- ~ ~ ,o - I
_O I
r- 0




'0 V' N V
- o fN



































































r- I,-C- 9 I
.
